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Cigarette smoking is a public health problem of staggering proportions.  
According to a 2014 report of the U.S. Surgeon General, more than twenty 
million Americans have died because of smoking in the last fifty years; 2.5 
million of those deaths were nonsmokers who were exposed to secondhand 
smoke.1  Although the tobacco control movement has helped to reduce 
dramatically the death and disease attributable to smoking, smoking is still the 
leading cause of preventable death in the United States.2  If persons under the 
age of eighteen were to continue to smoke at the current rate, 5.6 million children 
alive today would die prematurely from a smoking-related illness.3  Further, the 
burden of tobacco use is not shared equally.  Tobacco use hits certain 
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 1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—
50 YEARS OF PROGRESS 1 (2014), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-
progress/full-report.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 6, 11, 17. 
 3. Id. at 12. 
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populations particularly hard, with “disparities in tobacco use . . . across groups 
defined by race, ethnicity, educational level, and socioeconomic status.”4 
The same 2014 report concluded that tobacco-related death and disease is 
“overwhelmingly caused by cigarettes and other combusted tobacco products,” 
and recommended the “rapid elimination of their use.”5  Indeed, some have 
advocated for the elimination of cigarettes, or all combustible tobacco products, 
from the marketplace as part of a tobacco “end game” strategy.6  To date, 
however, no jurisdiction has taken this dramatic step, potentially because of the 
challenging politics such a policy would implicate.7 
Even in the absence of a prohibition on the sale of combustible tobacco 
products, it is possible that less comprehensive policy options would 
dramatically reduce cigarette-related death and disease.  One such option relates 
to the elimination of a particularly detrimental combustible tobacco product: 
menthol cigarettes.  Menthol is an organic additive used in cigarettes with 
analgesic cooling properties that reduce the harshness of tobacco smoke and the 
irritation of nicotine.8  Marketed as a characterizing flavor in cigarettes, menthol 
makes it easier to start smoking and harder to quit smoking.9  The disparities 
present in tobacco use generally are even more acute with menthol cigarette use 
as menthol-flavored cigarettes are targeted to and used disproportionately by 
groups with higher incidences of tobacco use, such as adolescents and 
minorities.10 
Restricting the presence of menthol in cigarettes would benefit public health 
and reduce cigarette-related death and disease.11  For example, a recent study 
showed that 38.9% of menthol smokers would quit in response to a prohibition 
on menthol cigarettes, including 44.5% of African American and 44% of female 
menthol smokers.12 
To combat the problem of cigarette smoking and other forms of tobacco use, 
Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
                                               
 4. Id. at 7. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Robert N. Proctor, Why Ban the Sale of Cigarettes? The Case for Abolition, 22 
TOBACCO CONTROL i27, i27 (2013). 
 7. See Mitchell Zeller et al., The Strategic Dialogue on Tobacco Harm Reduction: A Vision 
and Blueprint for Action in the U.S., 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 324, 325‒26 (2009). 
 8. TOBACCO PRODUCTS SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM., MENTHOL CIGARETTES AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH: REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/TobaccoProd
uctsScientificAdvisoryCommittee/UCM269697.pdf [hereinafter TPSAC REPORT]. 
 9. Id. at 2, 149. 
 10. Id. at 41, 76, 92, 150. 
 11. See id. at 225 (making the “overall recommendation” that “removal of menthol cigarettes 
from the marketplace would benefit public health in the United States”). 
 12. Jennifer L. Pearson et al., A Ban on Menthol Cigarettes: Impact on Public Opinion and 
Smokers’ Intention to Quit, 102 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH e107, e111‒12 (2012). 
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(FSPTCA) in 2009.13  This Act gave the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) unprecedented authority to regulate tobacco products to achieve the 
complementary goals of increasing tobacco cessation and reducing tobacco 
initiation.14  In the Act, Congress took an important step towards the goal of 
preventing youth smoking by prohibiting most cigarettes with flavorings,15 
recognizing the evidence that flavorings are a tool for tobacco companies to 
attract and addict younger generations of smokers.16 
The FSPTCA’s effectiveness was undercut, however, by Congress’s decision 
to exempt from the ban of potentially the most damaging flavoring of all: 
menthol.17  Menthol is consumed by nearly half of all youth smokers,18 making 
it far and away more pervasive than any of the flavorings banned by Congress.19  
There is no scientific reason to distinguish it from other flavorings.20  It is no 
                                               
 13. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).  The Act 
provided substantial oversight over tobacco products to the federal government, which would seem 
well suited to the task of limiting menthol.  See id. 
 14. See 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)(1) (2012); Nick Dantonio, Vape Away: Why A Minimalist 
Regulatory Structure Is the Best Option for FDA E-Cigarette Regulation, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1319, 
1348 n.173 (2014) (“Congress has now taken the unprecedented step of granting FDA jurisdiction 
over [tobacco] products.”) (quoting Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 680 
F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) aff’d sub nom. Sottera, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 627 F.3d 
891 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 16. Brian A. King et al., Flavored-Little-Cigar and Flavored-Cigarette Use Among U.S. 
Middle and High School Students, 54 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 40, 45 (2014). 
 17. Robert J. Baehr, A New Wave of Paternalistic Tobacco Regulation, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
1663, 1686 (2010) (“[W]orse still is the deadliness of the exemption.  While not much thorough 
research has been conducted outside of the tobacco industry, studies have demonstrated higher 
nicotine dependence and lower quit rates among smokers of menthol cigarettes.”); Paul A. Diller, 
Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1219, 1234 n.80 (2014) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 387g (2012)) (banning “artificial” and “natural 
flavor” additives, except for menthol); see also Paul Smalera, Cool, Refreshing Legislation for 
Philip Morris, THE BIG MONEY (June 8, 2009), http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/judgments/ 
2009/06/08/cool-refreshing-legislation-philip-morris (identifying that in the United States, 
“[m]enthols account[] for a quarter of the roughly 370 billion cigarettes smoked domestically in 
2006 and are more popular here than anywhere else in the world”). 
 18. NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, USE OF MENTHOL CIGARETTES 2‒3 
(2009), http://archive.samhsa.gov/data/2k9/134/134MentholCigarettes.htm. 
 19. See Baehr, supra note 17, at 1686 (“Young smokers have a distinct preference for it, far 
outstripping their preferences for other tobacco flavors.”); see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, 
Earmarking Earmarking, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 266 (2012) (“Public health advocates have 
roundly criticized the menthol exemption.”) (referencing Stephanie Saul, Opposition 
to Menthol Cigarettes Grows, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008, at C1 (noting opposition 
to menthol exemption by seven former Secretaries of Health and Human Services)). 
 20. See Robert L. Rabin, Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related 
Disease, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 507, 532 n.106 (2014) (“While there is no scientific 
evidence of greater health risks associated with menthol, it is considered a gateway to youth 
smoking and an impediment to quitting.”); see also Baehr, supra note 17, 1685‒86 (noting the 
difficulty in “ignor[ing] anecdotal evidence that Congress drafted this menthol exception expressly 
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less attractive to youth than the flavorings prohibited by the Act21 and, in fact, 
has additional drug-like properties that may impact addiction and cessation 
among youth and adults alike.22 
Exempting menthol from the flavor ban was a purely political decision.  A 
majority of African American smokers prefer menthol-flavored cigarettes,23 and 
any measure regulating menthol was seen by Congress as politically charged.24  
Instead of acting, Congress chose to pass the perceived “hot potato” to the FDA, 
delegating to the federal agency the controversial decision as to whether menthol 
should continue to receive favorable treatment or should be treated consistently 
with other flavorings.25  More than five years and two exhaustive studies later, 
the FDA continues to ponder this question.26 
FDA inaction on tobacco control is not unique to menthol, and it does not 
seem likely that the agency will adopt any regulations on menthol in the near 
future.27  Fortunately, in the absence of decisive federal tobacco regulation, state 
and local governments have stepped forward, regulating in creative ways with 
varying degrees of success.28  Indeed, some state and local jurisdictions have 
already begun or are considering29 regulating menthol tobacco products.30  
                                               
for Philip Morris,” and for Marlboro, whose “menthol brand constituted more than five percent of 
the total domestic cigarette market”). 
 21. See Baehr, supra note 17, at 1686. 
 22. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 24, 148‒49. 
 23. Id. at 42. 
 24. See Rabin, supra note 20, at 532 n.106; Stephanie Saul, Black Caucus Split on a Tobacco 
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at C1. 
 25. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012). 
 26. See infra Part I. 
 27. See generally Mark Gottlieb, Overcautious FDA Has Lost Its Way, 23 TOBACCO 
CONTROL 187 (2014). 
 28. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 17-706(a) (2010) (prohibiting the sale of tobacco to 
anyone under the age of twenty-one); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 
F.3d 71, 74‒75 (1st Cir. 2013) (upholding a Providence, Rhode Island, ordinance restricting sale 
of flavored non-cigarette tobacco products and prohibiting tobacco coupon redemption against a 
challenge based on preemption by the Labeling Act); 23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. New York 
City Bd. of Health, 685 F.3d 174, 180‒82, 185‒86 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down a New York City 
ordinance requiring graphic warnings depicting dangers of smoking to be posted at point of sale on 
the grounds that it was preempted by the Labeling Act); Laurel E. Curry, The Haverstraw 
Experience: The First Tobacco Product Display Ban in the United States, 104 AM. J. OF PUB. 
HEALTH e9, e9, e11‒e12 (2014) (describing how a Haverstraw, New York ordinance prohibiting 
the display of tobacco products was repealed in the face of a lawsuit by convenience store interests 
and big tobacco companies); Sean P. Murphy, Westminster Drops Proposal to Ban Tobacco Sales, 
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/11/19/westminster-drops-
proposal-ban-tobacco-sales/iUqa8BceSI1wO4rFtpqkUL/story.html (recounting a proposed 
ordinance to ban all tobacco sales in Westminster, Massachusetts, withdrawn after public outcry). 
 29. See, e.g., H.B. 1522, 27th Leg. (Haw. 2014) (prohibiting, if enacted, the sale of menthol-
flavored cigarettes). 
 30. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-64-180(b) (2013) (enacted) (restricting the sale 
of tobacco products with any flavor, including menthol, near schools). 
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Consequently, state and local regulation of menthol-flavored tobacco products 
may well represent an important part of future tobacco control efforts. 
Part I of this Article begins by illustrating why the use of menthol in tobacco 
products poses such a serious risk to public health.  Part II then describes actions 
the federal government has taken—or, more accurately, failed to take—to 
regulate menthol.  As a consequence of the relative dearth of federal action, and 
the leadership role state and local jurisdictions are undertaking, the bulk of this 
Article, in Part III, is dedicated to surveying state and local actions taken on 
menthol, describing additional actions state and local governments could take to 
address the problem, and investigating whether state and local governments 
actually have the authority to take these actions, concluding that they likely do.  
Finally, this Article concludes with an analysis of the policy merits of each 
option, and deduces from this analysis that the most effective way for a state or 
local government to address the public health problem of menthol tobacco 
products is through a sales restriction on the products. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF MENTHOL 
Before describing why menthol tobacco products pose a risk to public health, 
it is important to define what constitutes a menthol tobacco product.  Menthol is 
a compound used in many consumer and medicinal products that has cooling 
and analgesic properties.31  Menthol is present in many cigarettes, even those 
not marketed specifically as menthol cigarettes.32  Federal law has yet to 
establish a threshold, delineating an explicit concentration of menthol above 
which a nonmenthol cigarette becomes a menthol cigarette.33  Similarly, the 
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC), authorized by 
Congress to study the impact of menthol in cigarettes on public health,34 failed 
to adopt “a quantitative definition for a menthol cigarette, but instead relie[d] on 
the brand designation,” noting that “[t]hose cigarettes marketed as menthol have 
sufficient menthol content for menthol to become a ‘characterizing flavor.’”35  
This Article will use the terms “menthol cigarette” and “menthol tobacco 
product” consistent with the TPSAC definition.  That is, a tobacco product will 
be considered menthol if it has a level of menthol sufficient to rise to the level 
of a characterizing flavor. 
It is undisputed that menthol tobacco products pose a serious risk to public 
health, even beyond the risk already present in nonmenthol tobacco products. 
Two exhaustive studies have examined the existing data and publications on 
                                               
 31. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. 
 32. Id. at 2. 
 33. See 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012). 
 34. Id. 
 35. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 2. 
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menthol, and both concluded that the presence of menthol tobacco products in 
the marketplace poses a risk to public health.36 
The first study, approved by the TPSAC in July 2011, concluded that the 
“[r]emoval of menthol cigarettes from the marketplace would benefit public 
health in the United States.”37  Specifically, the TPSAC found that: 
[Menthol’s] pharmacological actions reduce the harshness of smoke 
and the irritation from nicotine, and may increase the likelihood of 
nicotine addiction in adolescents and young adults who experiment 
with smoking.  Furthermore, the distinct sensory characteristics of 
menthol may enhance the addictiveness of menthol cigarettes, which 
appears to be the case among youth.  TPSAC has found that the 
availability of menthol cigarettes has an adverse impact on public 
health by increasing the numbers of smokers with resulting premature 
death and avoidable morbidity.38 
The TPSAC also concluded that minority youth smoke menthol cigarettes at 
alarming and disproportionate rates, finding that “[m]ore than 80 percent of 
adolescent African American smokers and more than half of adolescent Hispanic 
smokers use menthol cigarettes.”39  Use of menthol products is also prevalent 
among non-minority youth, unemployed persons, and individuals making less 
than $10,000 per year.40 
In July 2013, the FDA published its own exhaustive report on menthol 
entitled, “Preliminary Scientific Evaluation of the Possible Public Health Effects 
of Menthol Versus Nonmenthol Cigarettes.”41  Although the report notes that 
“there is little evidence to suggest that menthol cigarettes are more or less toxic 
or contribute to more disease risk to the user than nonmenthol cigarettes,” it still 
reaches the conclusion that it is likely “that menthol cigarettes pose a public 
health risk above that seen with nonmenthol cigarettes” because menthol 
tobacco products are associated with an increased rate of smoking initiation by 
youth, possessing greater addiction potential than nonmenthol products, and 
making quit attempts less successful.42 
Other studies have noted the same disparate use patterns of menthol.  A 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health found that menthol cigarettes are used 
at disproportionately higher rates by racial and ethnic minority smokers, 
including African Americans (82.6%), Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islanders 
                                               
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 37‒42. 
 37. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 225. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 48. 
 40. Id. 
 41. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE 
PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTS OF MENTHOL VERSUS NONMENTHOL CIGARETTES 1 (2013), http:// 
www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PeerReviewofScientificInformationand
Assessments/UCM361598.pdf [hereinafter FDA MENTHOL REPORT]. 
 42. Id. at 6. 
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(53.2%), Hispanics or Latinos (32.3%), and Asian Americans (31.2%), in 
contrast to white smokers (23.8%).43  Also, approximately seventy-one percent 
of all young LGBT smokers use menthol cigarettes,44 and nearly half of all teen 
smokers use menthol tobacco products.45  In addition, a convincing body of 
evidence has shown tobacco-related health disparities are exacerbated by 
targeted marketing strategies in minority areas,46 a practice previously linked to 
menthol tobacco products.47 
Considering the relative consensus among the scientific community that 
menthol tobacco products particularly pose a serious public health problem, one 
would expect the federal government to take prompt action on this crisis.  
Unfortunately, the federal government has remained relatively inactive, 
frustrating many of those in the public health community. 
II.  FEDERAL INACTION ON MENTHOL 
Any discussion of federal regulation of menthol tobacco products must begin 
with analyzing the FSPTCA.48  This landmark legislation entrusted to, for the 
first time, the FDA the authority to adopt tobacco product standards aimed at 
improving public health.49  The FDA, in determining whether a proposed 
tobacco product standard will improve public health, must consider three things: 
first, “the risks and benefits to the population as a whole”; second, “the increased 
or decreased likelihood that existing users will stop using such products”; and 
lastly, “the increased or decreased likelihood that [non-users of tobacco] will 
start using such products.”50 
One other provision of the FSPTCA warrants brief mention.  Section 105 of 
the Act required the FDA to “develop and publish an action plan to enforce 
restrictions . . . on promotion and advertising of menthol and other cigarettes to 
                                               
 43. NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, supra note 18, at 5. 
 44. NATIONAL YOUTH ADVOCACY COALITION, COMING OUT ABOUT SMOKING: A REPORT 
FROM THE NATIONAL LGBTQ YOUNG ADULT TOBACCO PROJECT (2010), http://lgbttobacco.org/ 
files/Coming_Out_About_Smoking_NYAC.pdf. 
 45. CASACOLUMBIA, TIME TO BAN MENTHOL 6‒7 (2014), http://www.casacolumbia.org/ 
addiction-research/reports/time-to-ban-menthol-report-2014. 
 46. Sarah Moreland-Russell et al., Disparities and Menthol Marketing: Additional Evidence 
in Support of Point of Sale Policies, 10 INT. J. ENVIRON. RES. PUB. HEALTH 4571, 4572, 4580 
(2013). 
 47. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater 
Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 123‒24 (2002) 
(noting that a “cigarette company was forced to withdraw its menthol cigarette, ‘Uptown,’ because 
the product was deliberately targeted at African-American consumers”); CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO COMPANY MARKETING TO AFRICAN AMERICANS 1, 3‒4 (2015), 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0208.pdf. 
 48. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.). 
 49. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 50. Id. § 387g(a)(3)(B)(i) (2012). 
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youth.”51  The FDA solicited public comment and issued an “Enforcement 
Action Plan for Promotion and Advertising Restrictions” in October 2010.52  The 
Action Plan includes provisions related to market surveillance of menthol 
cigarettes, but contained no restrictions on menthol that did not already apply to 
all cigarettes.53 
Although the FSPTCA provided the FDA wide discretion in adopting tobacco 
product standards, some requirements were created directly by Congress.  For 
example, in recognition of the appeal flavorings (such as candy, fruit, and 
alcohol) have for children and young adults,54 the FSPTCA prohibited any 
cigarette from containing a characterizing flavor.55  Importantly, the prohibition 
exempted tobacco and menthol flavors, and did not apply to non-cigarette 
tobacco products.56 
The political compromise exempting menthol generally was not well 
received.57  The New York Times wrote: 
With menthol brands making up about 28 percent of the $70 billion 
American cigarette market, the exemption was seen as a necessary 
compromise to win broad backing for the legislation.  But menthol has 
become a politically charged subject in Washington because an 
estimated 75 percent of black smokers choose mentholated brands.58 
The African American Tobacco Prevention Network, arguing that the 
exemption was discriminatory, claimed that the menthol exemption “sends a 
message that African American youngsters are valued less than white 
youngsters.”59  In contrast, others argued, albeit weakly, that making such 
arguments was equivalent to playing a “race card.”60  In a disturbing twist, the 
Lorillard Tobacco Company, the largest producer of menthol cigarettes,61 
cynically tried to co-opt African American history in support of continued 
menthol exemption, arguing that “the history of African Americans in this 
country has been one of fighting against paternalistic limitations and for 
                                               
 51. 21 U.S.C. § 387f-1(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 52. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ENFORCEMENT ACTION PLAN FOR PROMOTION AND 
ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS 1‒5 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM227882.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 11‒14. 
 54. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 16, at 44‒45. 
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Saul, supra note 24; Cuéllar, supra note 19, at 266. 
 58. Saul, supra note 24. 
 59. Andrew Cheyne et al., The Debate on Regulating Menthol Cigarettes: Closing a 
Dangerous Loophole vs Freedom of Choice, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e54, e57 (2014). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Andrew Zajac, Lorillard Wins Ruling on Tobacco Panel Conflicts, BLOOMBERG (July 
22, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-21/lorillard-wins-ruling-
on-tobacco-panel-conflicts. 
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freedoms.”62  Some, including the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
have countered this inane argument by correctly mentioning that addiction to a 
substance, such as nicotine, countervails freedom.63 
Acknowledging the public health problems left unaddressed by the menthol 
exemption, the FSPTCA directed the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory 
Committee (TPSAC) to study “the impact of the use of menthol in cigarettes on 
the public health, including such use among children, African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and other racial and ethnic minorities.”64  In July 2011, the TPSAC 
ireached the conclusion that the removal of menthol cigarettes from the 
marketplace would benefit public health.65 
Rather than act promptly, the FDA instead announced that it would conduct 
“a preliminary independent scientific evaluation of existing data and research on 
menthol cigarettes.”66  Although this may seem like a typical example of the 
intractable inertia of federal bureaucracies, the FDA’s decision to conduct an 
additional review on menthol irrespective of the TPSAC report was more likely 
a canny decision to mitigate a potential adverse ruling following a lawsuit filed 
by two of the largest tobacco companies against the FDA disputing the TPSAC’s 
determinations.  Some even suggest that the FDA commissioned the second 
report on menthol to “ensure that the evidence base for action was not clouded 
by the potential impact” of this lawsuit.67 
This lawsuit, challenging the composition of the TPSAC and arguing that 
some of the committee members had conflicts of interest, commenced in 
February 2011.68  In July 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia agreed with the tobacco companies’ allegation, concluding that the 
TPSAC’s “findings and recommendations, including reports such as the 
Menthol Report, are, at a minimum, suspect, and, at worst, untrustworthy.”69 
Unfortunately, the FDA delayed the release of its independent menthol report 
and continued to dawdle on the topic of menthol.  Although the peer review for 
the independent report was completed in early 2012, the report was not issued 
until July 2013,70 leading some to speculate that the delay was “to ensure that 
there would not be a proposed menthol rule issued before the 2012 Presidential 
election.”71 
                                               
 62. Cheyne et al., supra note 59, at e58. 
 63. Id. at e57. 
 64. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012). 
 65. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 225. 
 66. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Tobacco Products: Menthol Cigarettes, http://www.fda. 
gov/TobaccoProducts/PublicHealthScienceResearch/Menthol/default.htm (last visited July 14, 
2015). 
 67. Gottlieb, supra note 27, at 187. 
 68. Lorillard, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 56 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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The independent report reached conclusions similar to those of the TPSAC 
report, finding that menthol is associated with youth smoking initiation, greater 
addiction, and poses a public health risk surpassing that of nonmenthol 
cigarettes.72  Again, rather than taking prompt action, the FDA issued a 
nonbinding advanced notice of proposed rulemaking and took public 
comments.73  The comment period closed in November 2013, and despite calls 
on the agency to ban menthol, the FDA has been silent on the topic of menthol 
since then.74 
Not only is the congressional menthol exemption detrimental to the public 
welfare, but its inherent inconsistency with respect to the restriction of other 
cigarette flavorings, such as clove cigarettes, has also led to potential financial 
repercussions resulting from international disputes.75  After the FSPTCA flavor 
ban prohibited the importation of clove cigarettes, Indonesia—the largest 
exporter of clove cigarettes—successfully argued before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that the flavor ban was discriminatory because it applied 
to clove cigarettes while exempting menthol.76  A WTO panel sided with 
Indonesia, although the United States and Indonesia subsequently settled the 
dispute.77 
Given that the FDA appears to have little appetite for meaningful action 
regarding the regulation of menthol, it may be up to other levels of government 
to address this problem.  Fortunately, some state and local jurisdictions have 
adopted or introduced policy interventions addressing menthol.78 
III.  STATE AND LOCAL OPTIONS 
State and local governments are often viewed as a “laboratory” for innovative 
policy,79 and certainly seem like the natural governmental entities capable of 
tackling such a serious public health problem in the face of federal foot-
                                               
 72. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 6. 
 73. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Invites Public Input on Menthol in 
Cigarettes (July 23, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ 
ucm361966.htm. 
 74. See Letter from Twenty-Seven Attorneys General to Division of Dockets Management 
Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 8, 2013), http://ago.vermont.gov/assets/files/Consumer/ 
Tobacco/Menthol%20Letter.pdf. 
 75. Vicki Needham, US, Indonesia Settle Fight Over Clove Cigarettes, THE HILL (Oct. 3, 
2014), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/219755-us-indonesia-settle-clove-cigarette-dispute. 
 76. Id. (noting that the reviewing WTO Panel found that clove and menthol cigarettes are 
“like products” under controlling trade agreements “based in part on its factual findings that both 
types of cigarettes are flavoured and appeal to youth”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-64-180(b)(2013) (enacted) (restricting the sale 
of tobacco products with any flavor, including menthol, near schools); H.B. 1522, 27th Leg. (Haw. 
2014) (prohibiting, if enacted, the sale of menthol flavored cigarettes). 
 79. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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dragging.80  The tobacco control movement—a movement dedicated to the 
curtailment of tobacco products through the employment of public policy tactics 
founded in compelling empirical data81—can find several advantages in 
employing public policy options at the state or local level given the potentially 
lesser influence of political lobbying at these levels, compared with the federal 
level.82 
The tobacco control movement has relied on several different policy options 
to address the general problem of tobacco-related death and disease.83  These 
policies include sales prohibitions and restrictions, tax policies, other price-
related policies, age-of-sale regulations, disclosure requirements, and marketing 
restrictions.  Each of these options raises complicated legal issues as well as 
policy arguments for and against them, which this section evaluates.  The 
question becomes, however, whether these policy options could be used to 
address the specific tobacco control problem of menthol. 
A.  Sales Prohibition 
Federal law prohibits the presence of characterizing flavors in cigarettes, yet 
excludes menthol and non-cigarette tobacco products from this prohibition.84  
The most straightforward approach to addressing the problem of menthol would 
be to simply label it as a characterizing flavor in tobacco products, thereby 
removing it from the marketplace—an approach utilized in other countries, such 
as Brazil.85  Unfortunately, state and local governments cannot simply extend 
this prohibition to menthol tobacco products.  In adopting this section of the 
                                               
 80. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37 (1905) (affirming authority of the 
legislature “to care for the public health and the public safety when endangered by epidemics of 
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sales to minors); see also THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, supra note 1, at 788‒800 
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 84. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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PRODUCTS, 2 (March 23, 2012), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-
guide-reg-menthol-tips-tools-2015.pdf.  The European Union intends to adopt similar measures in 
2016.  Id.; Wiktor Sarzy, Poland to Challenge EU Ban on Menthol Cigarettes, BUS. INSIDER (July 
21, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-poland-to-challenge-eu-ban-on-menthol-cigarettes-
2014‒21; contra Alberta Exempting Menthol Cigarettes Under Flavoured Tobacco Ban, CBC 
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/alberta-exempting-menthol-
cigarettes-under-flavoured-tobacco-ban-1.2834374. 
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FSPTCA, Congress considered the flavor restriction to be a “tobacco product 
standard,” a regulation left in the exclusive domain of the federal government.86 
Although Congress preempted state and local adoption of tobacco product 
standards, it granted state and local governments’ wide authority to regulate the 
sale and distribution of tobacco products.87  Thus, a state or local government 
could consider prohibiting the sale of menthol tobacco products.  In fact, one 
government has considered doing this.  In the Hawaii legislature, bills were 
proposed that would have prohibited the sale of tobacco products containing any 
characterizing flavor, including menthol, with no exemptions for specific 
retailers.88  However, these bills were not enacted into law.  Accordingly, legal 
analysis is required to predict whether a court would have upheld such a 
regulation on menthol had the bill been passed into law. 
The answer to this question requires a detailed discussion of the FSPTCA’s 
three complementary provisions that affect local authority to regulate tobacco 
products.  A preservation clause grants state, local, and tribal governments the 
authority to adopt a range of tobacco control regulations that are more stringent 
than federal law.89  A provision within the preservation clause preserves the right 
of state and local governments to adopt regulations “relating to or prohibiting 
the sale [or] distribution . . . of tobacco products.”90  And, as mentioned 
previously, a preemption clause removes the ability of state and local 
governments to adopt “tobacco product standards.”91  However, the savings 
clause reiterates that the preemption clause “does not apply to requirements 
relating to the sale [or] distribution” of “tobacco products.”92  Notably, the 
savings clause excludes the word “prohibiting” that appears in the preservation 
clause. 
These provisions of the FSPTCA have not been widely litigated.  To the extent 
they have, however, court decisions have generally favored the authority of state 
and local governments.  The most relevant litigation involves ordinances from 
New York City93 and Providence, Rhode Island,94 both of which restricted the 
sale of non-cigarette tobacco products containing characterizing flavors—with 
                                               
 86. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(A) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012) (including ban on 
flavored tobacco products under “tobacco product standards”). 
 87. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
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 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
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 92. Id. § 387p(a)(2)(B). 
 93. See U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 431‒32 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
 94. See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 
2013). 
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the exception of menthol, mint, and wintergreen flavors.95  Both ordinances also 
contained limited exemptions for certain retailers.  For example, Providence 
exempted “smoking bars,”96 while New York City exempted “tobacco bars,” of 
which there were only eight and none sold flavored smokeless tobacco.97 
In both cases, tobacco manufacturers and retailers argued that the ordinances 
were tobacco product standards masquerading as sales restrictions.98  In both 
cases, federal district and circuit courts disagreed.  The First Circuit, 
emphasizing the exemption for smoking bars—which rendered the ordinance 
“not a blanket prohibition”—held that the Providence ordinance fell within the 
FSPTCA’s savings clause as a regulation relating to the sale of tobacco 
products.99  The Second Circuit held that the New York City ordinance was not 
preempted as a tobacco product standard, but was an acceptable sales regulation, 
explaining that a product standard is a regulation that would “require 
manufacturers to alter the construction, components, ingredients, additives, 
constituents, and properties of their products.”100  The court reasoned that the 
New York City ordinance was not a product standard because the city was 
concerned only with “whether final tobacco products are ultimately 
characterized by—or marketed as having—a flavor.”101 
While the Second Circuit’s primary holding was that the New York City 
ordinance did not rise to the level of a product standard, the court stated that 
even if the New York City ordinance were a tobacco product standard, it would 
fall within the FSPTCA’s savings clause as a requirement related to the sale of 
tobacco products.102  The court adopted a broad reading of the savings clause, 
noting that Congress decided to “preserve for the states a robust role in 
regulating, and even banning, sales of tobacco products.”103  The court felt that 
the ordinance was limited in scope because it regulated “a niche product,” that 
is, flavored non-cigarette tobacco products, and “not a broad category of 
products such as cigarettes or smokeless tobacco.”104  As further proof of the 
ordinance’s limited scope, the Second Circuit noted the exemption for tobacco 
bars.105 
                                               
 95. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 431‒32; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 
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Although a state or local government could not adopt a requirement 
prohibiting the manufacturing of a tobacco product with a menthol flavoring, 
these cases suggest that a state or local prohibition on the sale of menthol 
tobacco products might survive judicial scrutiny.  Still, some factors do suggest 
that courts might look less favorably on a state or local prohibition on the sale 
of menthol tobacco products than they did on the New York City or Providence 
ordinances. 
First, in finding that the New York City ordinance was a sales regulation 
within the FSPTCA’s savings clause, the Second Circuit considered it relevant 
that the ordinance regulated merely a “niche product.”106  Because one-third of 
U.S. smokers smoke menthol cigarettes,107 it would be more challenging to 
categorize them as a niche product.  However, it might not be impossible.  The 
Second Circuit distinguished “niche product[s],” like flavored non-cigarette 
tobacco products, from “a broad category of products such as cigarettes or 
smokeless tobacco,” thereby creating a spectrum of niche-ness.108  On this 
spectrum, menthol cigarettes would fall somewhere between flavored non-
cigarette tobacco products and all cigarettes.  Considering two-thirds of smokers 
do not smoke menthol cigarettes, menthol is likely closer to the former.109 
Second, a sales prohibition can be distinguished from the New York City and 
Providence ordinances, and would require a court to consider questions that 
neither the First nor Second Circuits directly addressed.  Most obviously, the 
New York City and Providence ordinances exempt tobacco bars and smoking 
bars respectively,110 while a sales prohibition would have no such exemption.  
Both circuits discussed the exemptions.111  However, they did not reach the 
question of whether such an exemption is necessary in order for the ordinance 
to fall within the savings clause.  There is some merit to this argument because 
the savings clause uses different language than the preservation clause.  The 
preservation clause discusses measures “relating to or prohibiting the sale . . . of 
tobacco products,”112 while the savings clause merely references regulations 
“relating to the sale . . . of[] tobacco products.”113  However, this does not mean 
that a state or local sales prohibition would necessarily be preempted.  When 
used with “to,” “relate” simply means “to have connection, relation, or 
                                               
 106. Id. at 436. 
 107. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 41. 
 108. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 436. 
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reference.”114  A sales prohibition would certainly be connected or related to the 
sale of tobacco products.  Still, it would likely be up to a court to determine the 
significance, if any, with respect to the absence of the word “prohibiting” from 
the savings clause. 
Finally, the FSPTCA contains several provisions that are specific to menthol 
cigarettes that appear to support the argument that it is the federal government, 
not state and local governments, that should be regulating these products.  First, 
as noted previously, the FSPTCA charged TPSAC with studying menthol 
cigarettes.115  However, Congress included a rule of construction that the 
obligation charged to the TPSAC did not limit the FDA’s “authority to take 
action under this section or other sections of this chapter applicable to 
menthol.”116  Arguably, this language suggests that Congress did not intend for 
menthol cigarettes to be treated any differently than other tobacco products 
under other sections of the FSPTCA.  Moreover, legislative history suggests that 
the TPSAC charge was motivated by concern that a nationwide menthol ban 
would lead to a black market in menthol cigarettes, and a sudden demand for 
cessation services that quitlines could not absorb.117  A state or local sales 
prohibition would not raise those concerns to the same extent. 
Additionally, the FSPTCA singles out cigarettes in ways that may raise 
concerns regarding a state or local regulation of menthol cigarettes.  Most 
notably, as previously discussed, the law prohibits cigarettes from containing a 
characterizing flavor, with the exception of tobacco and menthol flavors.118  This 
provision contains a rule of construction similar to the provision charging 
TPSAC with studying menthol, stating that the FDA retains authority to adopt 
regulations related “to menthol or any artificial or natural flavor, herb, or spice 
not specified in this subparagraph.”119  Again, this arguably suggests that 
Congress did not intend for the regulation of menthol tobacco products to be 
treated differently at the state and local level than other tobacco products 
pursuant to other sections of the FSPTCA.  Additional provisions of the 
FSPTCA regulate cigarettes,120 but none suggest that state and local authority 
should be diminished beyond what is in the preemption clause. 
These legal authorities suggest that a court may very well uphold a state or 
local prohibition on the sale of menthol tobacco products, and such a prohibition 
could be modeled off of the New York City and Providence ordinances that 
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restrict the sale of flavored non-cigarette tobacco products.121  However, some 
changes should be considered.  First, the exemption for menthol, mint, and 
wintergreen flavors should be eliminated.  Although smokeless tobacco products 
with a menthol flavoring do not appear to be as widely used as menthol 
cigarettes, there does not appear to be a sound public health basis for exempting 
these flavorings.  It has been conclusively demonstrated that menthol as a 
flavoring appeals to youth;122 mint and wintergreen flavorings are presumably 
no less appealing.  Second, to constitute a true sales prohibition, no retailer 
should be exempt from an ordinance the way tobacco bars and smoking bars 
were exempted in New York City and Providence, respectively.  Finally, the 
ordinance should have a provision including menthol cigarettes within the sales 
prohibition.  This provision would be the most controversial because of the 
number of menthol smokers, but, for the same reason, it would make the most 
substantive improvement in public health.  In order to decrease the risk of 
preemptive conflict with the FSPTCA’s prohibition on flavored cigarettes, this 
prohibition ought to be a separate section from the provisions related to non-
cigarette tobacco products and should make it explicitly clear that, in the case of 
cigarettes, the ordinance is regulating menthol.  This provision could also 
include a “sunset clause,” stating that the provision would cease to be in effect 
if and when the FDA added menthol to the list of prohibited flavors for 
cigarettes.  Finally, the ordinance should include a severability clause so that it 
remains in effect if any part of it gets struck down. 
Still, would such an ordinance be sound from a policy standpoint, and would 
it be practical?  Several arguments support a menthol sales ban.  First, it is a 
logical extension of the FSPTCA’s prohibition on flavored cigarettes.123  It 
would effectuate the conclusions of the TPSAC and FDA reports that removing 
menthol from the marketplace would benefit public health.124  It would remove 
a common starter product, making it less likely that youth would begin 
smoking.125  It would also help with smoking cessation among menthol 
smokers,126 which could help reduce tobacco-related disparities among 
classified diversity groups.  Moreover, because such a policy would not have 
any exemptions, it would presumably be more effective in reaching these 
objectives compared to policies that exempted certain retailers or tobacco 
products. 
Some arguments, however, cut the other way.  Legislative history shows that 
Congress exempted menthol cigarettes from the flavor ban because it was 
concerned about a potential black market for menthol cigarettes and a dramatic 
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increase in the need for cessation services.127  The threat of a black market is 
often used by the tobacco industry to argue against any meaningful tobacco 
control measure and is likely a red herring.128  The need for increased cessation 
services is a more serious concern, but it can certainly be addressed within the 
existing tobacco cessation infrastructure.  Standard tobacco control measures, 
such as tobacco tax increases129 or smoke-free laws,130 invariably lead to an 
increase in cessation attempts, but do not seem to overwhelm the system.  
Indeed, residents of every U.S. state have access to a tobacco quitline.131 
Political challenges and the risk of litigation present more serious 
impediments to adopting a state or local menthol sales prohibition.  As the 
congressional experience shows,132 it would be politically challenging to adopt 
a state or local menthol sales prohibition.  The tobacco industry has proven adept 
at using arguments related to tobacco smuggling, racial bias, and personal liberty 
to thwart effective menthol regulations.133  These arguments are generally 
specious,134 but can be effective with policymakers.135 
Further, as noted earlier, the First and Second Circuits relied in part on the 
presence of exemptions for smoking bars and tobacco bars, respectively, in 
finding that the cities’ ordinances fell within the FSPTCA’s savings clause.136  
It is by no means certain that a court would not uphold an ordinance without 
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 132. See, e.g., Saul, supra note 24. 
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such an exemption, but it is not guaranteed.  For that reason, a state or local sales 
restriction (i.e., not a prohibition) on menthol tobacco products will now be 
evaluated. 
B.  Sales Restrictions 
The most meaningful state or local menthol policy taken to date is a sales 
restriction enacted in Chicago.  In late 2013, the city council adopted an 
ordinance prohibiting the sale of any tobacco product containing any 
characterizing flavor—including menthol—by tobacco retailers located within 
five hundred feet of any school property line.137  At the time the ordinance was 
considered, 351 out of 2,986 tobacco retailers—or about 11.7%—were located 
within 500 feet of a school zone.138  The ordinance exempted “retail tobacco 
stores” that derive at least eighty percent of sales from tobacco and related 
products.139  Less than five percent of retail stores within the City of Chicago 
met the definition of “retail tobacco stores.”140 
Determining whether the Chicago sales restriction ordinance would be 
preempted as an invalid tobacco product standard requires legal analysis similar 
to that applied to a sales prohibition ordinance.  A sales restriction, compared to 
a sales prohibition, would seem to be an even clearer example of a restriction 
that “relat[es] to the sale [of] tobacco products”141 permitted under the 
FSPTCA’s savings clause because it exempts both “retail tobacco stores” and 
retailers located more than five hundred feet from a school.142  Indeed, an 
association of gas stations recently challenged the Chicago ordinance in federal 
district court,143 and preliminary decisions in this litigation suggest that the city 
was acting within its authority.144  Therefore, it appears likely that a court would 
uphold the ordinance. 
One can imagine a broader sales restriction that still falls short of a 
prohibition.  For example, rather than limiting the scope of the ordinance to 
within five hundred feet of schools, it could apply citywide or statewide, while 
still including narrow exemptions for certain retailers.  To ensure that the 
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ordinance has a maximum public health benefit, any such exemption should be 
drafted as narrowly as possible.  Consequently, exemptions could be modeled 
after the “tobacco bar” exemption in the New York City ordinance because only 
eight retailers met the definition.145  The exemption for “retail tobacco stores” 
in the Chicago ordinance also seems to be a potential model because less than 
five percent of retail stores in Chicago meet this definition.146  Other laws define 
tobacco retailers in ways that might also make useful models.147 
Presumably, by limiting the ordinance’s scope to within five hundred feet of 
schools, Chicago intended to address the appeal of flavored tobacco, especially 
menthol, to youth.  This is certainly a laudable goal, and the ordinance could be 
an effective way of addressing this problem.  However, menthol has also been 
shown to make it more difficult for adult smokers to quit,148 a problem left 
unaddressed by the geographically restricted Chicago ordinance.  Given that 
“88.25 percent of Chicago retailers can continue to sell menthol tobacco 
products,” it appears that these products will still be readily available to adult 
smokers.149  For that reason, a more comprehensive restriction would seem to be 
desirable from a public health standpoint. 
A statewide or citywide sales restriction with a limited exemption for adult 
tobacco retailers would seem to be a stronger ordinance because it would 
advance the complementary goals of preventing youth tobacco initiation while 
encouraging adult cessation.  While an exemption for adult tobacco retailers 
would undercut the latter goal somewhat, if the exemption is drawn narrowly 
enough, it would still help advance the goal by removing a tempting product—
i.e., menthol cigarettes—from locations adult smokers would frequent for 
reasons unrelated to a tobacco habit, such as gas stations. 
C.  Tax Policy 
Raising taxes on tobacco products has long been recognized as an effective 
method to help encourage cessation and limit tobacco initiation by youth who 
are especially price sensitive.150  It is certainly possible that a tax increase on 
                                               
 145. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 146. See Complaint at 5, Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 
14CV7536, 2015 WL 4038743 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2014). 
 147. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(c)(2)(ii) (2014) (exempting vending machines and self-
service displays that are monitored by the retailer from a requirement that tobacco sales be 
conducted in face-to-face exchanges with retailers); Minn. Stat. § 144.4167, subd. 4 (2008) 
(defining “tobacco products shop[s]” as a “retail establishment . . . that derives more than 90 percent 
of its gross revenue from the sale of” tobacco and various tobacco products). 
 148. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 6. 
 149. TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, REGULATING MENTHOL TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS 3 (2015), http://publichealthlawcenter.org//sites/default/files/resources/tclc-guide-reg-
menthol-tips-tools-2015.pdf. 
 150. See Jidong Huan & Frank J. Chaloupka, IV, The Impact of the 2009 Federal Tobacco 
Excise Tax Increase on Youth Tobacco Use 24‒29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 18026, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18026.pdf. 
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menthol tobacco products beyond the level applied to nonmenthol products 
would constitute an impetus to quit the smoking of mentholated products and 
potentially tobacco use altogether, and an additional deterrent to the initiation of 
mentholated tobacco use. 
There is a precedent for imposing price disparities among different tobacco 
products.  Certainly, the retail prices of different categories of tobacco products 
are not consistent.  This is in large part due to differential tax rates for products 
like cigarettes that typically see higher tax rates than products, such as cigars 
and smokeless tobacco, which typically have comparatively lower prices.151 
Some have recommended taxing tobacco products according to toxicity,152 a 
recommendation that is analogous to raising taxes on menthol tobacco products.  
While the evidence does not suggest that menthol tobacco products cause more 
direct physical harm to an individual than nonmenthol products, evidence does 
suggest that menthol products increase the likelihood of tobacco initiation and 
hinder cessation.153  Since both of these problems increase health care costs on 
society and individual tobacco users, there is some logic to enacting a similar 
method of leveling taxes. 
The most powerful argument against a higher tax rate for menthol tobacco 
products is that it would be regressive.154  Given that use rates for menthol 
tobacco products are inversely related to an individual’s socioeconomic 
status,155 a higher tax on menthol tobacco products would be felt most acutely 
by addicted persons who are least able to absorb the cost, a reality acknowledged 
during the Chicago ordinance campaign.156  Before recommending a sales 
restriction on all flavored tobacco products, the Chicago Board of Health 
considered several different policy options to address the problem of menthol.157  
The Board opposed a higher tax on menthol tobacco products because it believed 
                                               
 151. See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, THE BEST WAY TO TAX SMOKELESS 
TOBACCO 1 (2013), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0282.pdf. 
 152. See, e.g., Zeller et al., supra note 7, at 329‒30. 
 153. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 5‒6. 
 154. See KAREN RICHARDSON, SMOKING, LOW INCOME AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES: 
THEMATIC DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 12 (May 2001), http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_ 
86.pdf. 
 155. See TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 48. 
 156. See Whet Moser, The Good and Bad of Sin Taxes’ Impact on Chicago’s Poor, CHI. (Nov. 
7, 2013), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/November-2013/Chicagos-Sin-Taxes-Could-Have 
-More-Impact-on-the-PoorBut-Could-Benefit-Them-More-As-Well/. 
 157. See generally CHICAGO BD. OF HEALTH, HEALTHY CHICAGO: TRANSFORMING THE 
HEALTH OF OUR CITY, CURBING THE USE OF MENTHOL-FLAVORED CIGARETTES AND OTHER 
FLAVORED TOBACCO PRODUCTS AMONG YOUTH: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND OTHER 
STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL ACTION (2013), https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/ 
cdph/CDPH/MentholReport%20_Jan212014.pdf (discussing policies aimed at reducing access to 
and use of menthol cigarettes such as limiting venues where menthol products can be sold, limiting 
promotional offers, expanding cessation services, etc.) 
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such a tax would “place a disproportionate burden on minority communities that 
have already been the target of predatory marketing.”158 
Even in the absence of arguments that a tax increase on menthol tobacco 
products would be regressive, taxes are a perennially controversial policy option.  
In the context of a jurisdiction with a large proportion of minority communities, 
this is a valid concern.  However, considering taxation is well within the purview 
of state and local governments, and the FSPTCA’s preemption clause 
specifically states that the law does not “limit or otherwise affect any State, 
tribal, or local taxation of tobacco products,”159 coupled with the historically 
effective impact increased taxation has upon smoking rates,160 a tax policy 
targeting menthol tobacco products remains a viable policy option especially in 
communities where youth tobacco initiation is a larger concern, such as a college 
town.  Still, it is worth examining whether other policy options dealing with 
price could achieve some of the same goals. 
D.  Other Price-Related Policies 
State and local jurisdictions have adopted several tobacco control regulations, 
outside direct taxation, that affect the price of tobacco products.  As one 
example, the city of Providence, Rhode Island, adopted an ordinance that 
prohibits retailers from accepting any coupons that reduce the price of tobacco 
products in conjunction with restricting the sale of flavored non-cigarette 
tobacco products.161  Second, some jurisdictions simply set a minimum price for 
various tobacco products.162  Finally, some jurisdictions address price by setting 
a minimum pack size for various tobacco products.163 
The legality of these non-tax price regulations is not as clear cut as tax laws 
because the preservation clause of the FSPTCA preserves state and local 
                                               
 158. Id. at 6. 
 159. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1) (2012). 
 160. See, e.g., RAISING THE EXCISE TAX ON CIGARETTES: EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND THE 




=bv.96952980,d.aWw; CANADIAN CANCER SOC’Y, SURVEYING THE DAMAGE: CUT-RATE 
TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE 1900S 24‒25 (Oct. 1999), http://www.nsra-
adnf.ca/DOCUMENTS/PDFs/oct99taxrep.pdf. 
 161. See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 74 n.1 (1st Cir. 
2013). 
 162. See id. at 81 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that “as of 2009, 25 states had minimum 
price laws for cigarettes”); see also Minn. Stat. § 325D.33, subd. 1 (2014) (prohibiting the sale of 
cigarettes at less than cost to the retailer or wholesaler for the purpose of injuring a competitor). 
 163. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(b) (prohibiting the sale of cigarettes in quantities less than 
twenty); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE § 324.07(a) (2013) (prohibiting sales of cigarettes outside of their 
original packaging); GARDENA, CAL., CODE § 5.52.090(F)(1) (2015) (prohibiting the sale of cigars 
in quantities less than five). 
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taxation authority,164 but contains no reference to price regulations outside of the 
tax realm.  Accordingly, a legal analysis is required before attempting to apply 
these non-tax price policy options to menthol tobacco products.  Because 
menthol cigarettes are a larger public health burden than non-cigarette tobacco 
products with a menthol flavoring, it would be critical that any regulation of 
menthol apply to menthol cigarettes.165  This Article examines a coupon 
regulation first.  Because coupons could be considered advertisements, it must 
be determined whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
(FCLAA)166 would pose a bar to state or local action. 
The FCLAA preempts the ability of state and local governments to adopt any 
“requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health . . . with respect to the 
advertising or promotion of any” properly labeled cigarettes.167  However, in a 
provision adopted as part of the FSPTCA, the FCLAA goes on to permit state or 
local “regulations, based on smoking and health . . . imposing specific bans or 
restrictions on the time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes.”168 
In upholding Providence’s ordinance restricting tobacco product coupon 
redemption, the First Circuit found that the ordinance did not regulate the 
content of an advertisement; rather, the ordinance merely regulated the 
“manner” in which cigarettes were promoted, a practice consistent with the 
FCLAA.169  While this decision is not universally dispositive, it does strongly 
suggest that a state or local prohibition on the redemption of coupons for 
menthol tobacco products would also be upheld. 
The second non-tax policy option, a minimum price law for menthol tobacco 
products, is a restriction that likely stands on stronger legal footing than coupon 
redemption restrictions.  In upholding Providence’s coupon ordinance, the First 
Circuit noted that twenty-five states have minimum price laws for cigarettes, 
which support the notion that these laws would not be preempted by the 
FCLAA.170  Although a minimum price law for menthol tobacco products would 
likely be upheld, the fact that twenty-five states have such a law in place for 
cigarettes generally means that a minimum price law targeted at menthol 
products specifically would not make a huge difference in addressing the 
problem of menthol unless the minimum price of menthol cigarettes exceeded 
                                               
 164. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1). 
 165. See Richard J. O’Connor, Non-Cigarette Tobacco Products: What Have We Learned and 
Where Are We Headed?, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 180, 184 (2012). 
 166. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012). 
 167. Id. § 1334(b). 
 168. Id. § 1334(c). 
 169. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2013).  
Arguably, this reasoning is incorrect because coupons relate to the manner of sale and not the 
manner of speech. 
 170. Id. 
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the minimum price of nonmenthol cigarettes.171  Consequently, because the 
minimum price of menthol cigarettes would already be set in these states, the 
law would only be targeting products that do not pose as serious of a public 
health problem, i.e., non-cigarette tobacco products with a menthol flavoring. 
The third non-tax policy option, a minimum pack size, requires a similar 
analysis to the previous policy option.  In addition to the many state and local 
laws related to pack size already in place—and do not appear to have been 
challenged172—a federal regulation limits the pack size of all cigarettes to no 
more than twenty.173  Unfortunately, a comparable federal restriction for non-
cigarette tobacco products does not exist.174  Any minimum pack size regulation 
of menthol tobacco products, therefore, would apply only to non-cigarette 
tobacco products.  This would limit the utility of this approach in the context of 
menthol. 
It seems that, while all three of these options are on reasonably solid legal 
footing, the strongest option from a policy standpoint would be a state or local 
prohibition of coupon redemption and multi-pack discounts.  Tobacco 
manufacturers use coupons and other discounting techniques extensively to 
lower the price of their products, making them more widely available.175  This 
certainly has an adverse impact on public health in the context of a product like 
menthol, which is used more heavily by those of a lower socioeconomic status.  
However, this could also suggest that such a policy would have a regressive 
effect, similar to the arguments against policies that would tax menthol tobacco 
products at a higher rate. 
E.  Age-of-Sale Regulations 
A straightforward approach that could address the problem of menthol in 
tobacco products is to raise the minimum age at which the products can be 
purchased.  Currently, federal law sets the minimum age to purchase tobacco 
products at eighteen.176  Several states, cities, and counties, however, have, 
raised the minimum purchase age higher than that set by the federal government.  
Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey, and Utah have minimum purchase ages of 
nineteen.177  Evanston, Illinois, and New York City have a minimum purchase 
                                               
 171. See generally TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, CIGARETTE MINIMUM PRICE 
LAW (2011), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-guide-cigminimum 
pricelaws-2011.pdf (discussing policy benefits of increased cigarette prices). 
 172. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 173. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(b) (2014). 
 174. Michael Freiberg, Options for State and Local Governments to Regulate Non-Cigarette 
Tobacco Products, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 407, 428 (2012). 
 175. B.R. Loomis et al., Point of Purchase Cigarette Promotions Before and After the Master 
Settlement Agreement: Exploring Retail Scanner Data, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 140, 140 (2006). 
 176. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(a). 
 177. See ALA. CODE § 28-11-2(4) (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.76.100(a)(1) (West 
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-13.1(a) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-104(1) (West 
2014). 
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age of twenty-one.178  Suffolk County, New York, and Hawaii County have an 
age limit of twenty-one.179  None of these laws has been overturned, and it seems 
fairly clear that the FSPTCA—which allows for state and local regulation of the 
“use of tobacco products by individuals of any age”—preserves the authority of 
state and local governments to raise the purchase age beyond the federal age of 
eighteen.180 
If raising the age to purchase all tobacco products is not politically feasible in 
a jurisdiction, a strong argument remains to raise the age to purchase menthol 
tobacco products, or tobacco products with any flavoring, for that matter.  Like 
other characterizing flavors, menthol is a common starter product for young 
adult and minor smokers.181  Removing the ability of young adults between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty to purchase these products legally could have a 
positive effect in reducing tobacco initiation. 
F.  Disclosure Requirements 
In addition to allowing state and local governments to increase the age to 
purchase tobacco products, the FSPTCA also allows state and local governments 
to adopt tobacco control laws related to “information reporting to the State.”182  
While some state information reporting laws in the tobacco field relate to the 
ingredients of tobacco products,183 they could also conceivably relate to tobacco 
marketing.184  Some state laws even go as far as requiring tobacco manufacturers 
to disclose their promotional activities.185 
                                               
 178. See Derrick Blakley, Evanston Becomes First Illinois City To Raise Cigarette-Buying Age 
To 21, CBS CHI. (Nov. 7, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/11/07/evanston-
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 181. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 6. 
 182. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1). 
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 184. See generally TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, SUNSHINE LAWS: REQUIRING 
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“any manufacturer’s promotional sales plan, including a description of the plan in detail and the 
dates and period of time during which the plan is to be operative”). 
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A state or local law requiring tobacco manufacturers to disclose amounts spent 
on the marketing of menthol tobacco products broken down by geographic area, 
e.g. a ZIP code, could provide the public health community with valuable 
information.  Evidence has shown that tobacco manufacturers disproportionately 
promote menthol tobacco products in predominantly low income and minority 
areas.186  If a law were to require the production of data showing these 
documented marketing disparities, that data could be used to identify improper 
advertisement practices, which could provide an impetus for a more substantive 
policy addressing menthol, such as a sales restriction. 
G.  Marketing Restrictions 
Modified by the FSPTCA, the FCLAA permits state and local regulations “on 
the time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or promotion of 
any cigarettes,” even when those regulations are based on smoking or health.187  
Accordingly, any regulation in this area must adhere to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  To be sure, this jurisprudence sets a 
high bar for tobacco marketing regulations,188 but it may not be an 
insurmountable bar.  For example, the First Circuit upheld the Providence 
restriction on coupon redemption as an acceptable regulation of “the ‘manner’ 
of promotion.”189 
One can imagine many time, place, and manner restrictions tailored to restrict 
menthol, particularly inhibiting the appeal of menthol as a factor in youth 
tobacco initiation.  A “time” restriction could prohibit the marketing of menthol 
tobacco products outdoors or in any place minors can enter before a curfew.  A 
“place” restriction could prohibit the marketing of menthol tobacco products 
outdoors or in a minor accessible facility located within one thousand feet of a 
school.  Finally, a “manner” restriction could restrict the use of video 
advertisements for menthol tobacco products in retail stores that can be entered 
by minors. 
To be sure, each of these policy options would likely face powerful opposition 
from tobacco manufacturers and retailers.  The small city of Haverstraw, New 
York, for example, adopted a display ban but rescinded the ordinance when 
faced with a lawsuit.190  Upon the eventual occurrence of litigation, marketing 
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restriction laws would likely be challenged under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Central Hudson test,191 a test that the Court has used to strike down previous 
restrictions on the marketing of tobacco products.192  However, such a regulation 
could be upheld if the ordinance was drafted narrowly, for example, including 
an exemption for adult-only facilities.  In addition, a marketing surveillance 
campaign should be implemented in any jurisdiction considering such a law, 
considering the appeal of menthol tobacco products to impressionable minors 
and young adults.  Such a law could have a powerful effect on reducing youth 
initiation and would be consistent with internationally-recommended policies on 
tobacco marketing.193 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Historically, state and local governments have had a wide variety of policy 
levers available to address the public health problem of tobacco.  Although state 
and local governments are beginning to address the specific problem of menthol, 
many of these same policy options could be used nationwide to address the 
serious public health problem posed by menthol tobacco products.194  The policy 
option that would likely have the most immediate and greatest positive effect on 
public health would be a prohibition or restriction on the sale of all flavored 
tobacco products, including menthol cigarettes.  Short of that, more modest 
options such as raising the age to purchase menthol tobacco products or 
requiring tobacco manufacturers to disclose the amount spent on marketing 
menthol tobacco products could also have a positive impact on public health and 
yield useful information. 
To be sure, any of these options would require a large amount of groundwork 
in terms of coalition building, data collection, and advocacy.  They would also 
likely face daunting legal challenges from tobacco manufacturers and retailers.  
However, in light of the federal government’s continued failure to take 
meaningful action to address this problem, time and resources spent working on 
and defending such a policy would be well spent. 
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